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In the 1970s and 1980s the US position as the global technological leader was increas-
ingly challenged by Japan and Europe. In those years the US skill premium and residual
wage inequality increased substantially. This paper presents a two-region quality ladders
model of technical change where firms from the leading region innovate in all sectors of
the economy, while the lagging region progressively catches up as its firms enter global
innovation races in a larger number of sectors. As the innovation gap closes, the ad-
vanced country experiences fiercer foreign technological competition which forces its firms
to innovate more. Faster technical change then increases the skill premium and residual
inequality. Offshoring production and innovation plays a key role in shaping the link
between international competition and inequality. The quantitative analysis exploits the
variation in the geographical distribution of R&D investment in OECD STAN data to
construct a measure of international technological competition between the US and the
rest of the world. In a calibrated version of the model, the observed increase in foreign
competition experienced by US firms accounts for up to 1/6th of the surge in the US skill
premium and up to one half of the increase in residual inequality between 1979 and 1995.
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1 Introduction
Wage inequality has increased rapidly in the United States in recent decades. The skill premium,
measured as the college/high school wage ratio, increased by approximately 20 percent from the
late 1970s to the early 1990s, while residual wage inequality - the wage dispersion across workers
with similar observable characteristics - increased by about 15 percent over this period (Autor,
Katz and Kerney, 2008 and 2010, and Heatcote et al., 2010). At the same time, American firms
experienced fiercer international competition as Japanese and European firms were progressively
closing the gap with the US technology frontier. Focusing on R&D investment as a proxy
for innovation, there is evidence of a substantial change in the geographical distribution of
innovation during this period: the US share of global R&D investment in manufacturing sectors
declined from about 50 percent in 1979 to 39 percent in 1995, while Japan’s share increased
from 17 to 28 percent in the same period (OECD STAN). Although, the across-sector average
for Europe is fairly constant, in some innovation-intensive industries Europe’s share of global
R&D grows substantially in this period. Similar trends are observable for the distribution of
patent counts and citations (Cozzi and Impullitti, 2015, Akcigit, Ates, and Impullitti, 2015).
This suggests that US global technological leadership was increasingly challenged by foreign
firms during the years of increasing wage inequality.
What is the role of foreign technological competition in shaping the dynamics of US wage
inequality in the 1980s and 1990s? In this period US firms offshore a non negligible share of
production and innovation activities.1 How does offshoring affect the link between increasing
foreign competition, technical change and wage inequality?
This paper tackles these questions in a version of the quality ladder growth model (Grossman
and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1992) in which a backward region progressively catches
up with the leading region by increasing the number of industries in which it participates in
innovation races for global leadership. The increase in international competition for innovation
between the two regions affects the incentive to innovate and wage inequality in the leading
economy. The two regions, domestic and foreign, share the same size and preferences, and
their economies are populated with a continuum of monopolistic competitive sectors with firms
1The employment share of US affiliates of multinational corporations is on average 26%, and the R&D
employment share of US affiliates is on average 12% in these years (BEA International Investment Statistics).
Moreover, the share of imported intermediates has increased from about 6% in 1980 to 12% in 1990, to about
20% in 2000 (Feenstra and Jensen, 2012).
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investing in innovation to improve the quality of goods. The top-quality firm in each industry
becomes the leader and supplier in a global economy without trade barriers. The trade direction
of each product may reverse over time as the identity of the quality leader changes. The
patterns of trade are determined by the number of sectors in which each countries’ firms have
technological leadership, which depends on firms’ past investment in innovation.
International technological competition is represented by the following feature of the econ-
omy: I assume that the domestic region is the world leader in that its firms invest in innovation
in all sectors of the economy, while foreign firms innovate only in few sectors. The share of sec-
tors in which firms from both regions compete in innovation is used as a measure of international
competition. Each firm undertakes two activities: production of goods using unskilled workers,
and innovation employing skilled workers. Workers have heterogeneous abilities drawn from a
fixed distribution. They can decide to spend time in school in order to become skilled workers
and acquire a level of efficiency proportional to their innate ability. The presence of a fixed cost
of education determines the ability cutoff above which workers attain education. Hence, the
relative supply of skills is endogenous and responds to changes in the skilled/unskilled wage ra-
tio, the skill premium. Moreover, since skilled workers are paid proportionally to the efficiency
gained during their schooling period, the dispersion of skilled wages is affected by the cutoff
ability level for obtaining education.
As foreign firms enter the global innovation race in a sector, with a probability proportional
to their innovation effort, they become the global quality leaders and production shifts abroad.
As a consequence, the domestic demand for production workers declines, triggering a reduction
in domestic unskilled wages. This wage-stealing effect increases the skill premium in the domes-
tic country directly by reducing unskilled wages, and indirectly by increasing firms’ profits and
therefore their incentive to innovate. Since innovation is the skill-using activity, the increase in
profits triggers an increase in the relative demand of skills and in the skill premium. Finally,
an increase in the returns to education induces workers with lower ability to acquire education,
thereby increasing the ability dispersion of skilled workers and of their wages. Hence, stiffer
international competition leads to higher residual inequality as well as higher skill premium.
In the benchmark economy labor markets are assumed to be completely local and firms
cannot locate either production or innovation abroad. I then introduce the possibility of off-
shoring production and innovation at no additional cost. Offshoring allows firms to locate their
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activities where factor prices are lower, thus leading to factor-price equalization. Since labor
markets are global in this economy, the wage-stealing channel cannot operate and changes in
international competition affect inequality through a new mechanism: assuming that the inno-
vation technology has decreasing returns at the regional level, foreign entry in innovation in a
sector leads to a more efficient international allocation of innovation efforts, thereby increasing
the global demand for skills and the skill premium.2 This is the global efficiency effect. As
before, an increase in the skill premium increases the share of skilled workers and reduces their
average ability, thus leading to higher residual inequality.
In the quantitative analysis I use OECD STAN data on R&D investment in two and three-
digit manufacturing industries to construct an empirical measure of the type of international
competition presented in the model. The US is the domestic region and Japan and Europe
represent the foreign region. The sectors where US investment in research dominates global
spending in innovation are labeled gap sectors, while the sectors where innovation efforts are
more evenly distributed across countries are called neck and neck. The share of neck-and-neck
sectors in the economy is the empirical measure of international competition I focus on. The
data show that about 42 percent of sectors are neck-and-neck in 1979 rising to 68 percent in
1995. Feeding the model the observed reduction in competition yields the following results:
under local labor markets, there is an increase in inequality accounting for about 1/6th of
the increase in the skill premium, and approximately 45 percent of the growth in residual
inequality observed between 1979 and 1995. In the economy with offshoring, the observed
increase in competition accounts for seven percent of the increase in the skill premium and
about 1/5th of the growth in residual inequality. Although the real economy lays in a middle
ground between the two theoretical extremes of completely local and completely global labor
markets, my stylized economies provide a possible lower and upper bound for the effects of
foreign technological competition in inequality.
The large literature on US wage inequality in recent decades focuses on two main sources,
globalization and technological change (see Hornstein, Krusell, Violante, 2005, and Acemoglu
and Autor, 2010, for a survey). One strand of the literature studies the effects of trade liber-
alization on wage inequality when technology is given (e.g. Yeaple, 2005, Burstein and Vogel,
2010), and another analyzes the interaction between trade liberalization, technical change and
2There is strong empirical evidence on the decreasing returns to innovation at the country level (see e.g.
Hall et al. 1986, Kortum, 1993, Blundell et al. 2002).
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wage inequality (e.g. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 1999, Acemoglu, 2003, and Epifani and
Gancia, 2008). The present paper follows this second line of research in that technology is
endogenous, but analyzes a source of inequality different from trade liberalization: the increase
in international technological competition triggered by foreign entry in global innovation races.
The paper is closely related to the research on international technology diffusion and innova-
tion which studies how changes in the cost and speed of diffusion affect the incentives to innovate
in trading economies. Keller (2004) provides a comprehensive survey of this large literature.
Some examples are Helpman (1993), Eaton and Kortum (1999) and (2006), Rodriguez-Claire
(2007), and Hsieh and Ossa (2010). Helpman (1993) sets up a quality ladder growth model
with an innovating region (North) and an imitating region (South) trading freely. Faster tech-
nology diffusion, represented by a reduction in the imitation cost, spurs innovation by reducing
wages - the cost of innovation. Eaton and Kortum (1999) build a multi-country quality ladder
model in which all countries innovate and contribute to the world technology frontier, and
diffusion depends on each country’s capacity to adopt foreign technologies. Following Eaton
and Kortum, in this paper both regions innovate but there is a reduced-form representation
of technology diffusion: the exogenously-given level of international technological competition
can be thought of as the equilibrium outcome of different adoption rates (or barriers to diffu-
sion). This simple way of modeling diffusion allows me to directly exploit the variation in the
geographic distribution of R&D investment obtainable from the OECD STAN data. Similarly
Krugman (1979), presents a diffusion model in which the leading country is assumed to be able
to produce virtually all the goods in the economy, whereas the follower country can produce
only the “old” goods. As in the present article, both countries have the same preferences and
technologies, and the difference in production possibilities is exogenous. Krugman suggests
that the source of the productive advantage of the leading economy might be related to a more
skilled labor force, external economies, or to a difference in “social atmosphere.” In the case of
the growing technological competition between the US, Europe and Japan that I analyze, one
important exogenous source could be innovation policy. US technology policy mainly targeting
military innovations was key in shaping US technological leadership in the post-WWII period
(Nelson, 1993), while the aggressive industrial policy of the Japanese Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) and some European success stories like Airbus, could be at the root
of these countries’ entry in global R&D races in the 1980s (see e.g. Tyson, 1992, and Nelson,
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1993).3
Impullitti (2010) uses a similar model of diffusion to explain the effects of foreign competition
on innovation and welfare, but assumes away any effect on the labor market.4 Akcigit, Ates,
and Impullitti (2015), analyze the effects of foreign competition due to technology diffusion
on welfare and on optimal innovation subsidies, in a multi-country growth model with step-
by-step innovation. The main contribution of this paper is first, to provide a theory of how
faster international technology diffusion affects wage inequality - a channel that is not explored
in the existing literature - and secondly, to quantify the contribution of this specific channel
to the path of inequality observed in US data. In a companion paper, Cozzi and Impullitti
(2015) endogenize international competition making it dependent on differences in innovation
technology/capabilities across countries. Similarly to what I do here, Cozzi and Impullitti
(2015) study the effects of increasing foreign technology competition on innovation and wage
inequality, but they focus on wage polarization across different tasks (innovation, production,
and personal services), and do not consider the possibility of offshoring.
There is a growing body of work analyzing the effects of offshoring on wage inequality.
Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) among others have high-
lighted channels through which trade in intermediates and offshoring opportunities affect the
skill premium. In this line of research the source of inequality is represented by changes in
the opportunity (cost) of offshoring, for a given level and structure of technology. Acemoglu,
Gancia, and Zilibotti (2015) contribute to the literature by introducing innovation and studying
how lower offshoring costs affect the direction of technical change, which in turn determines
wage inequality. I follow a similar approach in analyzing the interaction between offshoring and
endogenous technology, but I assume that all goods can be offshored and focus on how changes
in international competition affect innovation and inequality in the presence of offshoring.
Finally, the literature on globalization and inequality has mainly focused on one measure
of inequality - the skill premium - while little attention has been given to the rise in residual
inequality. The record increase of US wage dispersion across workers with similar observable
3The main argument made by the innovation policy literature is that goverments can stimulate firms entry
in innovation by either providing, through procurement, a sufficiently large market size that makes it worth
for firms to pay the high fixed costs and bear the high risk of investing in innovation; or facilitate commercial
innovation through tax susidies and technology transfer (see e.g. Hart, 2001, and Hausman and Rodrik, 2003)).
For an in depth discussion of innovation and industrial policy theories and evidence see Fagerberg, Mowery, and
Nelson (2004), and Harrison and Rodriguez-Claire (2010).
4Rodriguez-Claire (2007) and Hsieh and Ossa (2010) focus on quantifying the welfare effects of technology
diffusion as well, using different data and frameworks.
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characteristics in recent decades5 has been mostly linked to changes in the speed and structure of
technological change (e.g. Acemoglu, 1999, Caselli, 1999, Galor and Moav, 2000, and Violante,
2002). I contribute to this literature by analyzing how globalization, in the form of increasing
technological competition, affects innovation and the returns to observed and unobserved ability,
thus shaping the dynamics of residual inequality. The model’s prediction that growth in residual
inequality is driven by increases in the share of educated workers in the population is in line
with the empirical results of Lemieux (2006). Using May CPS data, Lemieux shows that a
large fraction of the increase in residual inequality is attributable to an increasing dispersion
of unobserved workers’ abilities in the 1980s, a period in which the workforce grows older and
more educated.
2 Stylized facts
In this section I introduce and discuss the data providing motivation for the paper as well as
empirical support for the quantitative analysis. First I discuss the dynamics of the skill pre-
mium and residual inequality in the US. Secondly, I explore the evolution of countries’ shares
of R&D investment at the industry level. As my interest is in international competition among
technological leaders, I restrict the attention to the US, Japan, and 10 European countries:
Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain, and the Nether-
lands.6 I then build an index of countries neck-and-neckness in R&D; that is, I construct a
measure of the share of industries where domestic and foreign countries effectively compete for
innovation. This allows me to obtain an empirical measure for the international technological
competition defined in the model, which is used to perform quantitative analysis.
2.1 Wage inequality
The returns to college show a drastic increase starting in the late 1970s, as shown figure 1.
In 1978 the college premium is substantially equal to its value in 1963, with college graduates
earning about 50 percent more than high school graduates and dropouts. From 1979 to 1995 the
college premium increases by about 21 percent, with college graduates earning about 80 percent
5Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), and Lemieux (2006) provide comprehensive empirical analysis of the
evolution of residual wage dispersion in the US.
6In the period 1973-1995, R&D expenditures in these countries represent between 95 and 98 percent of global
R&D investment in manufacturing (OECD ANBERD Rev.2, 2005).
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more than workers with lower levels of education. Since I interpret the returns to schooling as
the true relative price of skills, the college premium will be the definition of the skill premium
in the paper.7
Figure 1: Skill Premium and Residual Inequality in the US.
Source: Autor, Katz, Kerney (2008), Eckstein and Nagypal (2004), and Lemieux (2006)
Figure 1 also shows the trend of residual inequality, measured as the variance of the residuals
from a Mincerian regression of log wages on observable characteristics of workers, including
education.8 Residual inequality is therefore a measure of wage dispersion across workers with
similarly observable characteristic. The figure shows a small increase before 1979 and, as in the
case of the college premium, a steady increase afterwards, scoring a 30 percent growth between
1979 and 1995.
7Since returns to schooling may reflect returns to individual ability, the changes observed in figure 1 might
be driven by composition effects (changes in the distribution of ability across education groups). As shown in
Acemoglu (2002) and Acemoglu and Autor (2010) composition effects cannot account for the observed dynamics
of the wage structure in the last thirty years. Hence the changes in the returns to schooling shown in the figure
can be interpreted as changes in the true price of skills.
8Since in the model residual inequality will be defined as the dispersion of wages of educated workers, the
series for residual inequality in figure 1 is obtained considering only wage dispersion among workers with a college
degree or higher. The share of the total variance of residuals attributable to educated workers is obtained from
Lemieux (2006) decomposition. The total variance of residuals is taken from Eckstein and Nagypal (2004).
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2.2 Global R&D investment and international competition
I use OECD STAN ANBERD data on R&D investment for two and three-digit manufacturing
industries. Grouping together the 10 European countries, figure 2 reports sectorial average
R&D investment shares for the US, Japan, and Europe. The figure shows that, while European
countries as a whole kept a fairly constant share, the US share declined substantially, from 52
to 39 percent between 1973 and 1995, while Japan’s share increased from 17 to 28 percent in
the same period.9 This suggests that the US position as the global leader in R&D investment
was increasingly challenged by Japanese firms, while Europe’s share shows only a moderate
increase. Figure 2 provides a clear picture of convergence in global R&D efforts. Cozzi and
Impullitti (2015), and Akcigit, Ates, and Impullitti (2015), show that a similar convergence
path can be observed for innovation output, patents, and its quality, patent citations.
Figure 2: Global R&D Shares.
Source: OECD STAN
Table 1 reports countries’ shares in medium and high-tech sectors in 1973 and 1995.10 The
9Similar results are obtained with the weighted average, where sectors’ shares of total R&D are used as
weights. The US weighted share, for instance, decreases from 57 percent in 1973 to 44 percent in 1995.
10The OECD classifies sectors in high-tech, medium high-tech, medium low-tech, and low-tech according
to their R&D intensity (see Hatzichronoglou, 1997). High-tech and medium-high-tech industries represent 77
percent of total manufacturing R&D in the period considered.
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US share declines in all sectors except for Drugs and Medicines, Japan’s share scores record
increases in the most innovative industries: in Electrical Machineries the share rises from 16.6
percent to 43.2 percent (a 160 percent increase), in Office and Computing Machineries from
about 6 to about 30 percent (a 368 percent increase), and in Radio, TV and Communication
Equipment from 13 to 25 percent (a 95 percent increase). Europe provides a mixed picture
with a substantial increase in Aircrafts (13 percent increase) - probably related to the entry of
AIRBUS in the global market for airplanes - and in Motor Vehicles (16 percent increase), as
well as decreases in Chemicals and Office and Computing Machineries. A similar picture can
be obtained in medium and low-tech sectors which I do not show for brevity.
Table 1. Global R&D Shares (medium/high-tech secs)
1973 1995 % change 1973-95
industry US JAP EU US JAP EU U.S. JAP EU
Aircrafts** 74.2 0.08 0.241 68.4 1.4 27.3 -7.76 81.6 13.3
Chem. no drugs* 39.7 18.5 39.8 35.9 26.1 36.3 -9.38 40.6 -8.68
Drugs and meds.** 41.3 14.5 42.2 45.5 16.8 34.6 10.1 15.7 -18
Electrical Machinery * 54.3 16.6 27.8 24.6 43.2 30.8 -54.5 160.3 10.6
Motor vehicles* 56.5 13.6 28.8 45.01 20.1 33.51 -20.4 47.7 16.3
Office & computing mach.** 76.5 6.4 16.1 53.7 30.2 13.98 -29.8 368.5 -13.2
Radio, TV & Comm. Equi.* 54.2 13.1 29.9 40.3 25.6 28.76 -25.5 95.08 -3.93
Source: OECD STAN
This data can be used to build a measure of countries’ neck-and-neckness in innovation.
For each year, in the period 1973-95, I consider a sector neck and neck if the US share of total
R&D investment is smaller than a certain threshold (NT henceforth). The measure of the
neck-and-neck set of industries, that I call ω, is defined as the percentage of sectors with US
R&D share below the threshold NT . I compute ω for different threshold values in the grid
NT ∈ (0.35, 0.68), and the final index is chosen taking the average index across thresholds.11
This empirical index has been built to match the definition of technological competition studied
in the model presented in the next section.
Figure 3 shows the values of ω obtained using the bottom threshold NT = 0.35 and the
top threshold NT = 0.68; it also shows the average ω, which is computed taking the mean of
all the ωs obtained at each threshold levels in the set CT ∈ (0.35, 0.68). All measures show
11The grid is chosen in order for the bottom threshold to yield a low and the top threshold to yield a high
Herfindhal index of market concentration. More precisely, when the US share of global R&D is 0.35 and the
rest of the market is equally spread between the Japan and Europe, the Herfindhal index for a sector (adjusted
for the number of countries) is 0.01, which indicates a highly competitive market. While when the US R&D
share is 0.68 the Herfindhal index is about 0.18, which is the level above which a market is considered highly
concentrated.
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Figure 3: International Technological Competition Index
Source: OECD STAN and author’s calculations
an increasing trend, the average ω, which is the index of international competition used in the
quantitative analysis, increases from 0.3 (30 percent of the sectors are neck-and-neck) in 1973
to 0.68 in 1995.12
As figures 2 and 3 show, in the mid-1990s the convergence in R&D investment across
countries seems to be completed. Interestingly, the increase in US wage inequality also slows
down in that period (see e.g. Acemoglu 2002, and Acemoglu and Autor, 2010). For this reason I
focus the analysis on 1979-1995, the period of major increase in inequality and faster innovation
convergence.
3 The model
In this section I set up the model and derive the steady state equilibrium system of equations.
The model combines elements of Dinopolus and Segerstrom (1999) and Impullitti (2010). It
embeds the quality ladder growth structure with endogenous human capital accumulation of the
12Using the average index allows me to address the problem of sensitivity to small changes that fixing one
specific threshold might produce.
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Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, but considers asymmetric countries as countries, as in Impullitti
(2010), and explores global economies with and without the possibility of offshoring production
and innovation.
3.1 Households
The economy is populated by two regions with the same population and preferences. In both
regions there are heterogeneous households, differing in their ability to acquire working skills
θ ∈ (0, 1). Households have identical unit elastic preferences for a continuum of consumption
goods ω ∈ (0, 1), and each is endowed with a unit of labor/study time whose supply generates
no disutility. Household of type θ is modelled as dynastic family that maximize intertemporal
utility
U =
∫ ∞
0
N(0)e−(ρ−n)t log uθ(t)dt, (1)
where population is specified according to N(t) = N(0)ent, with initial population N(0) nor-
malized to 1 and a constant population growth rate n. The rate of time preference is ρ, with
ρ > n. The utility per person is given by
log uθ(t) ≡
∫ 1
0
log
jmax(ω,t)∑
j=0
λjqθ(j, ω, t)
 dω (2)
where qθ(j, ω, t) is the per-member quantity of good ω ∈ [0, 1] of quality j ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}
purchased by a household of ability θ at time t ≥ 0. A new vintage of good ω yields a quality
λ times that of the previous vintage, with λ > 1. Different versions of the same good ω
are regarded by consumers as perfect substitutes after adjusting for their quality ratios, and
jmax(ω, t) denotes the maximum quality in which the good ω is available at time t.
At each point in time households choose the quantity purchased of each good qθ(j, ω, t) in
order to maximize (2) subject to the per-period expenditure constraint. The utility function
has unitary elasticity of substitution between every pair of product lines. Thus, households
maximize static utility by spreading their expenditures cθ(t) evenly across product lines and
by purchasing in each line only the product with the lowest price per unit of quality13. Hence,
the household’s demand for each product is:
qθ(j, ω, t) =
cθ(t)
p(j, ω, t)
for j = jmax(ω, t) and is zero otherwise. (3)
13I assume that if there are two goods with the same quality-adjusted price, consumers will buy only the good
with higher quality.
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Given the optimal allocation of expenditures across different product lines at a given moment
t in (3), the intertemporal optimization problem yields the Euler Equation
·
cθ(t)
cθ(t)
= r(t)− ρ. (4)
Individuals are finitely-lived members of infinitely-lived households, being continuously born
at rate β and dying at rate δ, with β − δ = n > 0; V > 0 denotes the exogenous duration of
their life14. They choose to acquire education and become skilled, if at all, at the beginning
of their lives, and the duration of their schooling period, during which the individual cannot
work, is set at Tr < V . In region K = D (domestic), F (foreign) an individual with ability θ
decides to acquire education if and only if:∫ t+V
t
e−
∫ s
t r(τ)dτwKL (s)ds <
∫ t+V
t+Tr
e−
∫ s
t r(τ)dτ max (θ − γ, 0)wKH (s)ds, (5)
with 0 < γ < 1 defining a threshold ability requirement so that an agent with ability θ > γ
is able to accumulate θ − γ units of skills after schooling, while a person with ability below
γ gains no skills from education. Parameter γ could be interpreted as an ability-specific fixed
cost of education.15
I focus on steady-state analysis, in which all variables grow at constant rate and wL, wH ,
and cθ are all constant. From the Euler equation (4) we obtain r(t) = ρ at all dates, and solving
(5) with equality that agents acquire education if and only if their ability is higher than the
following cutoff
θK0 =
[(
1− e−ρV ) / (e−ρTr − e−ρV )] wKL
wKH
+ γ ≡ σw
K
L
wKH
+ γ. (6)
with σ ≡ [(1− e−ρV ) / (e−ρTr − e−ρV )]. I assume that agents draw their innate ability from
a cumulative distribution function Γ(θ). This implies that Γ(θK0 ) is the share of region K
population deciding to not acquire education, and
LK(t) ≡ Γ(θK0 )N(t) (7)
is the supply of unskilled labor at time t. A fraction
(
1− Γ(θK0 )
)
of the population decides
to attain education and the skilled workforce is represented by the subset of these agents that
14It is easy to show that the above parameters cannot be chosen independently, but that they must satisfy
δ = n/(enV − 1) and β = nenV / (enV − 1) in order for the number of births at time t to match the number of
deaths at t+ V .
15This way of modeling the accumulation of skills has been first introduced by Findlay and Kierzkowski
(1983), and extended to heterogeneous agents by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999).
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have completed their schooling period, that is individuals born between t− V and t− Tr. The
supply of skilled labor in efficiency units at time t is then
HK(t) = θ˜K(θK0 )
(
1− Γ(θK0 )
)
φN(t), (8)
with 0 < φ ≡ (en(V−Tr) − 1) / (enV − 1) < 1 and
θ˜K(θK0 ) =
[∫ 1
θK0
(θK − γ) dΓ(θ)
1− Γ(θK0 )
]
(9)
is the average ability of educated workers. In steady state the growth rate of LK(t) and HK(t)
is equal to n for K = D,F .
3.2 Production
In each region, firms can hire unskilled workers to produce any consumption good ω ∈ [0, 1]
under a constant return to scale technology with one worker producing one unit of product. The
unskilled wage rate is wKL and I set w
F
L = 1, so that the unskilled foreign wage is the numeraire of
this economy. As we saw in the previous section, only the top quality of each good is demanded
by consumers, therefore in each industry only the product with the highest quality is produced.
Quality leaders in each sector are challenged by followers that employ skilled workers to discover
the next top-quality product. In this model, as in the baseline quality ladder growth model,
leaders and followers have the same production and innovation technology, thus the Arrow
effect implies that in equilibrium only followers innovate.16 Successful innovation yields global
market leadership which is protected by a perfectly enforceable patent law.
I assume that the technologies to produce goods one quality ladder below the top are
obsolete and diffuse freely. This assumption allows foreign successful innovators to become
global market leaders.17 The unit elastic demand structure encourages the monopolist to set
the highest possible price to maximize profits, while the existence of a competitive fringe sets
a ceiling equal to the world’s lowest unit cost of the immediately inferior good on the quality
16An incumbent considering investing in innovation needs to subtract its present monopoly profits from the
payoff of successful innovation, whereas followers have zero profits before innovating. It follows that the value
of innovation for the followers is higher than for the leader. See Aghion and Howitt (1992) for a discussion of
the Arrow effect, and Cozzi (2007) for a recent interpretation.
17Without this assumption if a leader experiences successive innovations, followers will be pushed out of
the market permanently. The assumption of immediate diffusion of the old production technology is dis-
cussed in Glass (1997) and widely used both in North-North models of trade and growth (e.g. Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom,1999), and in North-South models (Glass, 1997, Glass and Saggi, 1998).
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ladder. Thus, the profit maximizing price of the quality leader is a limit price on the cost of
the follower (competitive fringe).
In order to determine the optimal pricing I anticipate a fundamental feature of the model
that will be discussed more in depth in the next two sections. I assume that domestic firms
invest in innovation and compete for market leadership in all sectors of the economy, while
foreign firms invest only in a subset of sectors. The share of industries in which domestic and
foreign firms invest in innovation is the measure of the international technological competition
I focus on. I call these industries ‘neck and neck’, while the remaining industries in the product
space are the ‘gap’ industries. Hence, a larger share of neck-and-neck industries implies a
stronger international competition to achieve global market leadership. Since domestic firms
can potentially be leaders in all sectors of the economy, they produce more and demand more
unskilled labor, thus paying higher wages. To obtain an non trivial market structure I focus on
the equilibrium in which the gap between the two countries’ unskilled wage is constrained by
the following condition, wDL /λ ≤ wFL ≤ wDL . This narrow gap case (Grossman and Helpman,
1991) allows for equilibrium product-cycle trade (Vernon, 1966) with global market leadership
shifting from domestic to foreign firms as the latter innovate and viceversa. Although the
foreign region has a cost advantage in production, focusing on the narrow gap case guarantees
that the wage gap is not so large that a foreign follower can price a domestic leader out of the
market without innovating.18
Since both domestic and foreign followers operate with the same technology, and for-
eign unskilled labor is cheaper, domestic followers do not represent an effective competitive
threat in sectors where firms from both countries are active in innovation. Thus the price
pK (jmax(ω, t), ω, t) of a top quality good is
pK (jmax(ω, t), ω, t) = λwFL (t) = λ (10)
in neck-and-neck sectors for K = D,F . In gap sectors, the competitive fringe cost is the
domestic wage and limit pricing leads to
pD (jmax(ω, t), ω, t) = λwDL (t). (11)
18If foreign firms’ cost is instead always lower than that of domestic firms, we would have a less general and
less interesting equilibrium with only foreign firms producing in neck-and-neck sectors.
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From (3), we can conclude that the demand for each product ω is:
(cD(t) + cF (t))N(t)
pK (jmax(ω, t), ω, t)
= q (ω, t) , (12)
where cD(t) =
∫ 1
0
cDθ (t)dθ and c
F (t) =
∫ 1
0
cFθ (t)dθ are average per-capita expenditures at
time t. Letting q (ω, t) be the quantity produced of good ω, the above equation implies
that supply and demand of goods are equal in equilibrium. It follows that the stream of
monopoly profits accruing to domestic quality leaders in neck-and-neck industries is piDn (ω, t) =
q (ω, t)
(
λwFL − wDL (t)
)
= (cD(t)+cF (t))N(t)
(
1− wDL (t)/λ
)
, where I have used (3) to substitute
for q (ω, t). Profits of domestic leaders in gap industries are piDg (ω, t) = q (ω, t)
(
λwDL (t)− wDL (t)
)
=
(cD(t)+cF (t))N(t) (1− 1/λ), and profits of foreign leaders are piF (ω, t) = (cD(t)+cF (t))N(t) (1− 1/λ).
3.3 Innovation races and the value of a firm
In each industry, quality followers employ skilled workers to produce a probability intensity
of inventing the next top-quality version of their products. The arrival rate of innovation
in industry ω at time t is I(ω, t), which is the sum of the Poisson arrival rate of innovation
produced by all firms targeting product ω. The innovation technology available to a firm i in
region K for innovation in sector ω is
IKi (ω, t) =
AhKi (ω, t)
(
HK(ω,t)
X(ω,t)
)−α
X(ω, t)
, (13)
whereX(ω, t) > 0 measures the degree of complexity innovation, α > 0, HK(ω, t) =
∑
i h
K
i (ω, t)
and IK(ω, t) =
∑
i I
K
i (ω, t) are total skilled labor and total innovation rate in sector ω and
region K respectively. This technology implies that each firm’s instantaneous probability of
success is a decreasing function of the total domestic labor resources devoted to innovation in an
industry. A possible interpretation of this property is that when firms increase innovation inputs
in a sector, the probability of duplicative innovation effort also increases, thereby reducing the
probability that any single firm will discover the next vintage of goods. Therefore, the sector-
specific negative externality in innovation technology produces decreasing returns to innovation
at the industry level. Moreover, (13) implies that this negative externality is also region-
specific;19 this feature can be motivated by the presence of fixed costs, such as lab equipment,
19There is strong empirical evidence on the nonlinearity of the relation between innovation activity of a
country (measured using patent data) and its R&D investment. Working with a large sample of US firm-level
data, Hall et al. (1986) find an elasticity of patents to R&D of 0.5. The evidence surveyed in Kortum (1993)
suggests point estimates for the patent/R&D elasticity in the range 0.1 - 0.6. More recently, Blundell et al.
(2002) find a long-run elasticity of 0.5.
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by institutional differences, and by the presence of a workforce with heterogeneous ability in
research.20
The complexity index X(ω, t) is introduced to avoid the counterfactual prediction of the
first generation innovation-driven growth models that the size of a region affects its steady-
state growth (Jones, 1995). Following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) I eliminate scale
effects assuming X(ω, t) = 2κN(t), with κ > 0, thereby formalizing the idea that it is harder
to innovate in a more crowded global market.21
Each innovating firm chooses lKi in order to maximize its expected discounted profits. Free
entry into innovation races drives profits to zero yielding
vK(ω, t)A
(
LK(ω, t)
X(ω, t)
)−α
/X(ω, t) = wKH (t). (14)
where vK(ω, t) is the value of a firm in sector ω and region K. This condition states that
the cost of one unit of skilled labor employed in innovation wKH must be equal to its benefits,
represented by the marginal product A
(
LK(ω, t)/X(ω, t)
)−α
/X(ω, t) times the prize for a
successful innovation vK(ω, t).
Efficient financial markets channel savings into innovative firms that issue a security paying
the monopoly profits if they win the race and zero otherwise. Since there is a continuum
of industries, and simultaneous and independent innovation races, consumers can perfectly
diversify away risk: the expected rate of return of a stock issued by a firm is equal to the
riskless rate of return r(t). It is easy to show that this leads to the following value of a firm
vK(ω, t) =
piK (ω, t)
r(t) + I(ω, t)− ·vK(ω, t)/vK(ω, t)
, (15)
where I(ω, t) denotes the worldwide Poisson arrival rate of an innovation that will destroy
the monopolist’s profits in industry ω. This is the Schumpeterian rate of creative destruction,
the expected value of a patent is inversely proportional to total innovation in the industry.
Substituting for the value of the firm from (15) into (14) and using (13) to express the amount
20Eaton and Kortum (1999) adopt a similar technology in their multi-country version of the quality ladder
growth model. They suggest a microfundation for decreasing returns in innovation at the country level based
on heterogeneous ability workers. As investment in innovation increases in a country, workers of lower ability
will be used and productivity will decline. This microfundation applies to this model as well.
21This specification of the difficulty index is a reduced form version of the solution to the scale effects problem
based on the assumption that aggregate R&D becomes more difficult over time as it is spread over more varieties
(see e.g. Howitt, 1999). In my simplified version of this approach, population growth mimics the expansion in
the variety of goods.
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of skilled workers in terms of the innovation rate we obtain the following conditions
piK (ω, t)
r(t) + I(ω, t)− ·vK(ω, t)/vK(ω, t)
(
IK(ω, t)
A
) −α
1−α A
X(ω, t)
= wKH (t), for ω ∈ (0, 1) and K = D,F
(16)
This condition, together with the Euler equation summarizes the utility maximizing household
choice of consumption, savings, and education, and the profit maximizing choice of production
and innovation. Innovation arrival rates determine the evolution of the average quality of goods
in the economy O(t) = lnλ
∫ 1
0
[∫ t
0
I(ω, τ)dτ
]
dω, obtained from the preferences in (2).
3.4 International technological competition
International competition is defined in the model by the share of industries where firms from
both regions compete in innovation. I assume that there exists an exogenously given subset
of industries ω ∈ (0, 1) where domestic and foreign researchers compete to discover the next
vintage of products, while in the complementary 1− ω industries only domestic firms compete
for innovation. This leads to the following composition of worldwide investment in innovation,
I(ω, t) = IDn (ω, t) + I
F (ω, t) for ω ≤ ω
I(ω, t) = IDg (ω, t) for ω > ω (17)
where IDg (ω, t) is innovation in sectors where only domestic firms compete to improve product’s
quality, and IDn (ω, t) is domestic innovation in industries in which foreign firms compete in
innovation as well; IF (ω, t) is foreign innovation.
The set of sectors ω could be obtained as an equilibrium result by, for instance, introducing
heterogeneous innovation technologies across industries and countries, as shown in Impullitti
(2010) and Cozzi and Impullitti (2015).22 For tractability I consider ω exogenous but, in order
to keep in mind this heterogeneous-industries interpretation, I call goods in the set ω ≤ ω
neck-and-neck industries and those in the set 1− ω gap industries. Besides tractability, there
is another reason to consider ω exogenous: the paper is motivated by the evidence discussed in
section 2 showing that US leadership in R&D investment is increasingly challenged by Japan
and Europe in the period considered. The goal of the paper is to build the simplest model that
22The goods in ω would be those for which the technology gap between the most advanced country (home)
and the laggards (foreign) is sufficiently small to allow the laggards to effectvely compete in innovation with
the leaders.
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allows to exploit that evidence. Introducing heterogeneous technologies would require data on
innovation technology at the region and sector level which are not available.23
Since goods ω ∈ (0, 1) are symmetric (same technologies, both in production and innova-
tion, and enter symmetrically in the utility function), the only source of structural asymmetry
between the two countries is represented by the partition of sectors in neck and neck and gap.
Therefore we can write, IDg (ω, t) = I
D
g (t) for all ω > ω, I
D
n (ω, t) = I
D
n (t) and I
F (ω, t) = IF (t)
for all ω ≤ ω.
3.5 Labor markets
To close the model we need to introduce the labor market clearing conditions and trade bal-
ance. I analyze two different benchmark economies. In one offshoring is not possible and,
consequently, labor markets for both types of workers are local. In the second scenario instead,
firms can offshore both innovation and production at no additional costs, leading to perfectly
global labor markets for skilled and unskilled workers, and to equalization of factor prices across
regions.
3.5.1 Local labor markets
The production technology specified above implies that the demand for unskilled workers is
equal to total production of goods in each national economy. For the domestic region the
unskilled labor market clearing condition is
Γ(θD0 ) =
[(
cD(t) + cF (t)
)
λ
] [
ωβ(t) +
(1− ω)
wDL (t)
]
, (18)
where the left-hand side is the population adjusted domestic supply of unskilled workers from
(7), and the right-hand side is the domestic demand for unskilled workers. The variable β(t)
indicates the fraction of neck-and-neck industries with a domestic leader. The structure of
global innovation activity specified in (17) implies that β(t) evolves according to the law of
motion
·
β(t) = (1− β(t)) IDn (t)− β(t)IF (t), (19)
where the first term on the right-hand side is the flow into β−type industries and the second is
the flow out. Hence, the relative strength of domestic innovation determines domestic leadership
23See Impullitti (2010) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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in neck-and-neck industries. Equation (18) shows that a higher ω leads to a higher aggregate
market size of domestic firms, and consequently to a higher domestic demand for unskilled
workers. Similarly for the foreign region we have
Γ(θF0 ) =
(
cD(t) + cF (t)
λ
)
ω (1− β(t)) . (20)
The market clearing condition for skilled workers in the domestic region is
θ˜D(θD0 )
(
1− Γ(θD0 )
)
φ = 2κ
ω(IDn (t)
A
)1/(1−α)
+ (1− ω)
(
IDg (t)
A
)1/(1−α) , (21)
where the left-hand side is the domestic supply of skilled labor (per capita) from (8), and the
right-hand side is the domestic demand for skilled workers obtained from (13) and X(ω, t) =
2κN(t). Similarly, the skilled labor market clearing condition for the foreign region is
θ˜F (θF0 )
(
1− Γ(θF0 )
)
φ = 2κω
(
IF (t)
A
)1/(1−α)
. (22)
To close the model we need to introduce the conditions for balanced trade: in each region
total expenditures plus savings (investment in innovation) must equal national income, wages
plus profits (or interest income on assets). The trade balance condition is
wDH(t)θ˜
D(θD0 )
(
1− Γ(θD0 )
)
φ+cD(t) = wDL (t)Γ(θ
D
0 )+
cD(t) + cF (t)
λ
[
(1− ω) (λ− 1) + ω (λ− wDL (t)) β(t)] ,
(23)
for the domestic region and
wFH(t)θ˜
F (θF0 )
(
1− Γ(θF0 )
)
φ+ cF (t) = Γ(θF0 ) +
cD(t) + cF (t)
λ
ω (λ− 1) (1− β(t)) , (24)
for the foreign region. Notice that investment in innovation is simply the wage bill of skilled
workers and that each region appropriates the monopoly rent associated to quality leadership
in the subset of industries where that region is the world leader.
3.5.2 Offshoring and global labor markets
Next, I consider an economy in which both production and innovation activities can be off-
shored. In order to keep the model tractable I focus on the simple case in which production
and innovation can be offshored at no additional cost. The first implication of full offshoring
is that both labor markets will be perfectly global, thus leading to factor price equalization
(FPE henceforth), implying wDL (t) = w
F
L (t) = 1, w
D
H(t) = w
F
H(t) ≡ wH(t), and consequently
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θD0 = θ
F
0 ≡ θ0. FPE and the first order conditions for innovation (27) imply that innovation
in neck-and-neck sectors is equalized, that is IDn (t) = I
F (t) ≡ In(t). The possibility of locat-
ing production and innovation abroad changes the labor market clearing conditions described
above as follows: there is only one market clearing condition determining the equilibrium of
the global market for unskilled workers,
2Γ(θ0) =
(
cD(t) + cF (t)
λ
)
, (25)
and one equilibrium condition for the global market for skilled labor,
2θ˜(θ0) (1− Γ(θ0))φ = 2κ
2ω
(
In(t)
A
)1/(1−α)
+ (1− ω)
(
IDg (t)
A
)1/(1−α) . (26)
4 Steady-state equilibrium
A balanced growth path for this economy is an equilibrium in which per-capita variables are
constant, the share of industries with a domestic leader is constant, the share of population
acquiring skills is constant, and the average quality of goods grows at a constant rate. Since
wages are constant in steady state, the free entry condition (14) and X(ω, t) = 2κN(t) imply
that
·
v
K
(ω, t)/vK(ω, t) =
·
X(ω, t)/X(ω, t) = n, for K = D, F and for all ω ∈ (0, 1). Per-capita
expenditure is constant in steady state, then the Euler equation (4) yields r(t) = ρ. The global
distribution of innovation and the equations for profits specified above imply that conditions
(16) become
vD(ω) =
(cD + cF )
(
1− wDL /λ
)
ρ+ IDn + I
F − n
A
2κ
(
IDn
A
) −α
1−α
= wDH , for ω ≤ ω
vF (ω) =
(cD + cF ) (1− 1/λ)
ρ+ IDn + I
F − n
A
2κ
(
IF
A
) −α
1−α
= wFH , for ω ≤ ω (27)
vD(ω) =
(cD + cF ) (1− 1/λ)
ρ+ IDg − n
A
2κ
(
IDg
A
) −α
1−α
= wDH , for ω > ω .
where I have used X(ω, t) = 2κN(t), r(t) = ρ, and
·
v
K
(ω, t)/vK(ω, t) = n
The steady-state version of the labor market clearing conditions (18), (20), (21), and (22)
can be obtained by simply dropping the time index and considering that in steady state (19)
implies β = IDn /
(
IDn + I
F
)
. Similarly the trade balance conditions (23), (24) can be ob-
tained by simply dropping the time index and using the steady-state values for β and θK0 .
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Using (6) to express θK0 as a function of wages, the equilibrium system is composed of nine
equations, (27), the steady-state versions of (18)-(22), (23) and (24), and eight unknowns(
cD, cF , IDg , I
D
n , I
F , wDH , w
D
L , w
F
H
)
. This is a general equilibrium model, thus for Walras
Law we can solve for eight equations and eight unknowns.
Factor price equalization in the economy with offshoring leads to a simpler equilibrium
system. With global wages, domestic and foreign firms’ values in neck-and-neck sectors are
equalized, vD(ω) = vF (ω) for ω ≤ ω, leading to equal innovation, IF = IDn ≡ In. Equations
(27) then become
(cD + cF ) (1− 1/λ)
ρ+ 2In − n
A
2κ
(
In
A
) −α
1−α
= wH , for ω ≤ ω (28)
(cD + cF ) (1− 1/λ)
ρ+ IDg − n
A
2κ
(
IDg
A
) −α
1−α
= wH , for ω > ω .
The other equilibrium conditions are the steady-state versions of global market clearing condi-
tions (25)-(26) and trade balance (23)-(24). Using (6) to express θK0 as a function of wages, the
equilibrium system is composed of six equations, (28), the steady-state versions of (25)-(26)
and (23)-(24), and five unknowns
(
cD, cF , Ig, In, wH
)
. Walras law allows us to solve for five
equations and five unknowns.
I complete the description of the model by deriving the two measures of inequality I focus
on, the skill premium and residual inequality. The skill premium, defined as the average wage
of skilled workers over the unskilled wage is
sK =
wKH θ˜
K(θK0 )
wKL
(29)
where θ˜K(θK0 ) is the average efficiency units of a skilled worker defined in (9). Wage dispersion
in the economy is pinned down by the dispersion of skilled wages. Since the wage of a skilled
worker with ability θ is wDH(θ) =
(
θD − γ)wDH , residual inequality is the variance of wDH(θ),
resK = var(θ) =
[∫ 1
θK0
(θK − γ)2 dΓ(θ)
1− Γ(θK0 )
]
−
[
θ˜K(θK0 )
]2
. (30)
5 Foreign competition, innovation and wages: analytical
results
In this section I derive a few analytical results providing some key intuitions for the effects of
an increase in international competition on innovation and wages in the home country. In the
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following section I calibrate the model and explore its properties numerically.
Offshoring. Factor price equalization attained in the economy with full offshoring simplifies
the model substantially and allows us to derive analytically the effects of foreign competition
on inequality. The results are summarized below.
Proposition 1 In an economy with complete offshoring an increase in foreign competition,
triggered by a larger number of neck-and-neck sectors ω, stimulates innovation, thereby raising
the relative skilled wage (wH) and decreases the ability cutoff θ0 in both regions. If the ability
distribution is logconcave, a reduction in θ0 increases the variance of skilled wages, thus raising
residual inequality.
Proof. See appendix.
The transmission mechanism from competition to inequality here is due to the endogenous
technology feature of the model. Innovation increases with ω because global innovation in neck-
and-neck sectors is higher than in gap sectors, 2In > I
D
g , therefore the total labor resources
devoted to innovation, the right-hand side of (26), increases with ω. This is what I call the
global efficiency effect and it is operates through the decreasing returns to innovation featured
in technology (13): the region-level concavity of the innovation technology implies that in each
industry, two skilled workers from two different regions are more productive than two skilled
workers from the same region. Thus, a higher ω leads to a larger number of sectors with higher
arrival rate of innovation and, consequently, to higher demand for skills worldwide. Notice that
the positive impact of a higher ω on global innovation could be offset by a negative effect on
sectorial innovation rates In and I
D
g . As I show in the appendix, although ∂I
D
g /∂ω and ∂In/∂ω
are both negative, the composition effect dominates, thus leading to an overall positive effect
of foreign competition on global innovation.24
Equation (6), shows that an increase in the relative wage of skilled workers wH/wL, raises
the return to education and reduces the ability cutoff θ0 to choose education, thus increasing
the share of skilled workers in the workforce. As a consequence, workers with lower ability enter
the skilled workforce. If the ability distribution is logconcave - a property of many common
distributions - a reduction in the cutoff θ0 increases the variance of skilled wages, our measure
24The effect of changes in ω on innovation per sector can be attributed to the higher obsolescence of innovation
produced by foreign entry.
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of residual inequality.25 Logoconcavity is only a sufficient condition for the wage variance to be
decreasing in θ0. In the quantitative analysis I choose a distribution among those that can be
logconcave under parameter’s restrictions and I let the calibration pin down the parameters’
value.
Finally, since an increase in skilled wages triggers a reduction in θ0, thereby leading to a
lower average ability of skilled workers, I cannot show analytically that higher ω leads to higher
average skill premium (wH θ˜(θ0)). The quantitative analysis that follows shows that the skill
premium, as defined in (29), is increasing in competition for a wide set of plausible parameters.
Local labor markets. Without offshoring, factor price equalization breaks down and the
model becomes less tractable. To gain some intuition we derive analytical results for a simplified
version of the model where technology is constant. The purpose of this exercise is to highlight
the mechanism behind the wage-stealing effect of international competition which does not
hinge on the presence of endogenous technical change. As we will see in the numerical analysis
this channel will be present in the full model with innovation as well. Assuming constant
technology implies that there is only one activity, production, and both types of workers are
used in this activity. Since in this case workers operate the same constant returns technology,
there is only one wage in each national economy, the production wage, and no incentive to
obtain education. The equilibrium is characterized by the steady-state version of the unskilled
labor market clearing conditions (18) and (20), and by trade balance (23)-(24), yielding the
equilibrium values of cD, cF and wD. The labor market clearing conditions, modified to take
into account that workers do not acquire education and that technology is constant, are
LD =
(
cD + cF
λ
)[
ωβ +
(1− ω)
wDL
]
and LF =
(
cD + cF
λ
)
ω (1− β)
where the labor supply is simply proportional to population LK = NK , and for simplicity we
assume LD = LF . Since there is no innovation, we assume that with exogenous probability β
domestic firms are the global leaders in neck-and-neck sectors ω, and with probability 1 − β
25An (1998) shows that the the left-truncated variance of logconcave distributions decreases in the truncation
point. A probability distribution is logconcave if the log of its pdf is concave. Many common distributions
are logconcave: the normal, uniform, logistic, extreme-value, Chi, Chi-square, and Laplace. Other common
distributions such as the power, Weibul, Gamma, Chi, Chi-squared, and Beta are logconcave for values of their
parameters larger than one (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005). Logconcavity is only a sufficient condition for the
variance of a left-truncated distribution to be decreasing in the truncation point. The Pareto distribution, for
instance, is not logconcave but its variance is decreasing in the left-truncation point.
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the leadership is obtained by foreign firms. Combining these two equations we obtain
wDL =
(1− ω)
ω
1
l (1− β)− β (31)
where l = ND/NF = 1 is the relative population. It is easy to see that dwDL /dω < 0.
Proposition 2 In an economy with constant technology and no offshoring, a larger number of
neck-and-neck sectors ω leads to lower domestic wages.
An increase in the fraction of sectors in which both domestic and foreign firms obtain a
share of the global market reduces domestic wages. This is the wage-stealing effect of increasing
foreign competition: as foreign firms enter new sectors in which previously only domestic firms
were operating, with some positive probability β production shifts abroad and the domestic
labor market clears at a lower wage. This admittedly harsh simplification for the model with
local labor markets serves the sole purpose of illustrating the wage-stealing effect. In the next
section, we calibrate the full model with local labor markets and show that this result holds also
with endogenous technology. With endogenous technology, the share of sectors with domestic
leaders is an equilibrium result of global innovation races, and an increase in ω shifts a fraction
of production abroad, thereby reducing the domestic demand for unskilled labor.
6 Quantitative analysis
In this section I calibrate the parameters of the model to match some basic long-run empirical
regularities of the US economy, compute the numerical solution using the calibrated parameters
and explore the effects of increasing international competition on wage inequality. I first analyze
the model for the economy with local labor markets and then study the economy with offshoring.
6.1 Calibration
I assume that abilities are drawn from the cumulative distribution function Γ(θ) = θε. This is a
fairly general distribution function in (0, 1): when ε = 1, the ability is distributed uniformly in
the population, when ε < 1 the ability distribution is skewed towards low-ability workers, and
for ε > 1 the ability distribution is logconcave.26 I need to calibrate ten parameters: six of them,
26This distribution is often used in quantitative models with heterogeneous agents, to match wage, income
and earning dispersion. See e.g. Chatterjie, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007), and Antunes, Cavalcanti,
Villamil (2008).
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ρ, λ, n, Tr, γ and V are calibrated using benchmarks that are standard in the literature, while
the other four, A, k, α and ε are calibrated internally so that the model’s steady state matches
salient facts of the economy. In the quantitative analysis, I explore the effects of the increase in
the international competition index shown in figure 3 on inequality from 1979 to 1995. Instead
of comparing two steady states, corresponding to the initial and final value of international
competition, we show our key endogenous variables for each intermediate value of international
competition to provide a more complete numerical characterization of this comparative statics.
Parameters calibrated “externally”. Some parameters of the model have close coun-
terparts in real economies so that their calibration is straightforward. I set λ to 1.4, to match
an average markup over the marginal cost of 40 per cent. Since, estimates of average sectorial
mark-up are in the interval (0.1, 0.4) (Basu 1996), I take a value within this range.27 I choose n
to match a population growth rate of 1.14 percent (Bureau of labor Statistics,1999). I choose
the total schooling time Tr = 4 to match the average years of college in the US, and total
working life V = 52 to match a life expectancy at birth for cohorts turning 18 years old in 1979
of 70 years (National Vital Report Statistics, 2010).28 Autor, Katz, and Kruger (1998) show
that the relative supply of skills (college and above over non-college) rises from 0.138 in 1970
to 0.25 in 1990. I follow this evidence by choosing the threshold γ = 0.75 to bound the relative
supply of skilled workers below 25 percent of the workforce. I set the discount rate equal to
ρ = 0.07, which corresponds to an annual discount factor of about 93%.
Parameters calibrated “internally”. I simultaneously choose A, κ, α, and ε so that the
numerical steady state solution of the model matches relevant US statistics. The calibrated
parameters’ values for the economy with local labor markets must be different from those for
the economy with offshoring because of different model’s closure. In this section, I match
the data to the theoretical moments from the model with local labor markets, and in section
6.3 I consider the model with offshoring. A, α, and κ are technology parameters relevant for
innovation, the demand for skills and the skill premium. The shape parameter of the ability
distribution ε affects the skill premium and wage dispersion. Hence I choose to calibrate A, κ, α,
and ε targeting the following statistics: the overall growth rate of the economy, the innovation
27I take the upper value of the range because the numerical solution is more robust with high λs.
28I consider that agents choose whether to go to college at age 18, so that the 18 years old cohort in 1979 is
represented by people born in 1961, and life expectancy at birth in 1961 in the US is 70 years. I also include
retirment years into working life assuming that pensions are proportional (equal for simplicity) to wages during
working life.
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investment share of income, the skill premium, and residual inequality.29 The parameters are
calibrated in order to minimize a loss function defined by the quadratic distance between the
moments in the model and the targeted statistics.
Since the paper focuses on innovation, it seems natural to use data from Corrado, Hulten
and Sichel (2006, CHS henceforth), where US national account data have been revised to in-
troduce investment in intangible capital, a new more comprehensive measure of investment in
innovation30. The model I set up does not have tangible (physical) capital, therefore national
accounting statistics used in the calibration must be adapted to the model economy. Hence,
the growth rate of productivity is obtained subtracting the share attributable to tangible cap-
ital from the overall growth rate, and the income share of intangible investment is obtained
subtracting investment in tangible capital from national income. After these adjustments the
CHS data report an average growth of labor productivity of 1.17 percent a year in the period
1970-79, and an average income share of intangible investment of 0.09 in the same period. I
target a skill premium of 0.4 (in logs), which is the 1979 value in Autor at al. (2008), and a
residual inequality of 0.05, the 1979 data point of figure 1 obtained with data from Heatcote
et al. (2010) and Lemieux (2006). Finally, in order to calibrate ω I use the 1979 value for
the international competition index obtained in figure 3 above, hence I set ω = 0.425. The
resulting calibrated values are A = 1.5, κ = 0.95, α = 0.1, and ε = 0.9. Table 2 shows how well
the model fits the US data at the initial data, 1979.
Table 2. Model fit (1979)
Data source Benchmark model
targeted
skill premium (logs) 0.4 Autor et al. (2008) 0.5
growth rate 0.0117 CHS (2009) 0.011
Innovation/GDP 0.09 CHS (2009) 0.09
residual inequality 0.05 Heatcote et al. (2010) 0.017
The calibrated model fits the targeted statistics fairly closely.
29In the present framework with quality-improving goods, growth is interpreted as the increase over time of
the consumer’s utility level, which is pinned down by the growth rate of quality. It is easy to show that the
growth rate is
g =
·
u
u
=
O˙(t)
O(t)
=
[
ω(IDn + I
F ) + (1− ω) IDg
]
lnλ.
30It includes R&D, computer software, and investment in a set of activities aimed at improving existing goods,
such as, advertising, design, marketing etc.
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6.2 International competition and wage inequality: local labor mar-
kets
I now analyze the effects of increasing international competition from its benchmark calibrated
value ω = 0.425 to full symmetry (ω = 1) on the skill premium and on residual inequality
in the economy without offshoring. Figure 4 below reports the simulation results using the
benchmark parameters, the robustness of the results to parameters’ change is analyzed in a
separate appendix, available upon request.
The wage-stealing effect, derived analytically for a simplified version of the model with
constant technology in the previous section, is confirmed in the numerical simulation of the
full model. Foreign entry in innovation in new sectors shifts market shares abroad and re-
duces production wages in the home region. This can be easily seen looking at the demand
for domestic unskilled labor, the right-hand side of (18): an increase in ω raises the share of
industries for which global leadership is shared according to countries’ relative innovation in-
tensity β = IDn /
(
IDn + I
F
)
, therefore reducing the domestic demand for unskilled labor. Notice
that this result is not simply produced by competition from a region with lower production
wages. The Schumpeterian innovation structure built in the model implies that global leader-
ship can be attained only producing a higher quality good. In existing multi-country models of
endogenous technical change, wage-stealing from foreign competition is obtained as the lagging
country imitates the leading technology and replaces the leading country’s firm because of lower
wages (e.g. Helpman, 1993). The novelty of the current model is to allow for technological
leapfrogging: in order to become the world leader, the lagging country’s firm must innovate
and produce a higher quality good.
Endogenous technical change plays an additional role in shaping the effects of foreign com-
petition on inequality. Foreign entry in innovation reduces domestic unskilled wages in neck-
and-neck sectors. Lower unskilled wages imply lower production costs and therefore higher
domestic profit rate in those industries (λ − wDL is the markup), as we can see in the figure.
Since innovation is profit-driven, innovation in neck-and-neck sectors IDn increases, boosting
the domestic demand for skills and the skill premium.31 Hence international wage stealing
31Notice that the domestic innovation per-firm in gap sectors IDg increases for low levels of ω and then it
decreases. The increase in IDg is a general equilibrium result produced by the optimal allocation of domestic
innovation investment between neck-and-neck and gap sectors. This additional innovation effect of competition
is, though, quantitatively of second order with respect to the increase in IDn : the former increases by about 10
percent as ω goes from 0.425 to 1, while the latter grows by more than 250 percent. Thus the relevant source
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Figure 4: International Competition and Inequality: No-Offshoring.
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increases the skill premium in the domestic region directly, because it reduces unskilled wages
and indirectly, because it increases the incentive to innovate.
of the increase in the relative demand of skills is innovation in neck-and-neck industries.
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Besides its effect on firm-level innovation efforts, international competition can affect inno-
vation and the relative demand of skills by changing the sectorial composition of innovation. It
is easy to show that domestic firms invest less in innovation in neck-and-neck sectors, IDn < I
D
g :
dividing up the first and the third condition in (27), we obtain(
λ− wDL
)
(λ− 1)
ρ+ IDg − n
ρ+ IDn + I
F − n =
(
IDn
IDg
) α
1−α
.
Since domestic unskilled wage is higher than foreign,
(
λ− wDL
)
/ (λ− 1) < 1, domestic innova-
tion must be higher in gap sectors, IDg > I
D
n . This result depends on the different obsolescence
of innovation in the two types of sectors: in neck-and-neck sectors there is less domestic inno-
vation because the equilibrium value of a patent needs to accommodate foreign innovation as
well. Domestic demand for skilled workers in (21) is a weighted average of IDn and I
D
g with
weights ω and 1 − ω respectively, hence an increase in ω reduces total domestic demand for
skills and consequently the skill premium. Quantitatively, this composition effect seems to be
second order, and the wage stealing channel seems to be the key driver of the link between
international competition and inequality.
The mechanism through which increases in foreign competition affect residual inequality
is the one described in section 5: a larger skill premium implies higher returns to education,
leading to a lower ability cutoff θD0 and to a higher dispersion of skilled wages.
32 The empirical
evidence in Lemieux (2006) shows that a similar channel has been driving the increase in US
residual inequality in the 1980s. He shows that a large fraction of the growth in residual
inequality in the 1980s is driven by an increasing dispersion of workers’ abilities, which in turn
can be attributed to a growing share of educated workforce.
Although the main scope of the paper is to study the response of inequality in the domestic
region to increasing international competition, it is worth to briefly discuss the dynamics of
foreign inequality. Figure 4 shows a U-shape relationship between ω and both dimensions
of foreign inequality, with the declining part dominating the increasing one. The economic
intuition can be easily grasped because it follows from the same mechanisms at work for the
domestic region. In this case the wage-stealing effect simply operates in the opposite direction:
foreign entry in innovation races in a sector leads to a larger foreign production and higher
32Notice that, although the calibrated ability distribution is not logconcave (ε = 0.9), the simulation in figure
4 shows that the variance of skilled wages increases as the cutoff θD0 declines. As discussed above, a logconcave
ability distribution is only a sufficient condition for the wage dispersion to be decreasing in the ability cutoff.
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demand for unskilled workers, and hence to a lower skill premium. The increasing part of the
U-shaped inequality response to competition is generated by the increase in the number of
sectors where foreign firms innovate, which raises foreign demand for skills.
I conclude this section assessing the quantitative relevance of the channels described above
in accounting for the observed increase in the US wage inequality. Recall that the skill premium
increases in the data by 21.8 percent and residual inequality increases by 30 percent in the period
between 1979 and 1995. In the same period the index of international competition shown in
figure 3 raises from 0.425 to 0.69, suggesting that the foreign region, Japan and Europe in the
data, was progressively catching up with the US in the race for global innovation leadership.
Taking this index as a measure of ω, I now quantify the effects of the observed increase in ω
on the two measures of inequality. Table 3 summarizes the results.
Table 3. International competition and inequality: no offshoring
model data explained
Skill premium % change (1979-95) 0.0331 0.218 0.158
Residual inequality % change (1979-95) 0.136 0.3 0.453
The increase in international competition observed in the data accounts for about 16 percent
of the 21.8 percent increase in the US skill premium, and about 45 of the observed increase
in residual inequality. Notice that the particular form of the skill premium sD adopted in
(29) biases downward the effects of increasing international competition on the skill premium.
Since, skilled wages are computed as wDH times the average ability level of the skilled workforce
θ˜D(θD0 ), when w
D
H increases and θ
D
0 decreases, agents with lower abilities enter the skilled
workforce reducing its average skill level θ˜D(θD0 ) and, consequently, the average skill premium.
Unskilled wages instead are not proportional to the average ability of the unskilled workforce,
hence, the effects of changes in ω on the skill premium shown in table 3 should be interpreted
as a fairly conservative quantitative evaluation.
Finally, figure 4 shows that as ω increases from 0.425 to 0.69, the skill premium and residual
inequality in the foreign region decrease, but quantitatively the size of this effect is fairly small.
Although the scope of the paper is not to explain the dynamics of inequality in the foreign region,
it is worth highlighting that the model’s predictions are not at odds with the evidence on foreign
inequality. In fact, there is consensus that wage inequality in these countries is fairly stable and
in some cases declining in the period of analysis. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, Krueger, and Sommer (2010)
find a declining education premium and a stable residual wage variance in Germany between
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1982 and 1995. Similar results can be found in Pijoan-Mas and Sanchez-Marcos (2010) for
Spain, but the data are limited to the 1990s. Domenej and Floden (2010) report sharp declines
of both measures of inequality for Sweden in the period 1975-95. Kambayashi et al. (2008) and
Kawagughi and Mori (2008), show that inequality in Japan is stable or slightly declining in our
period of analysis. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) find a stable education premium in Italy but
an increasing residual wage variance.
Although the model’s predictions shown in figure 4 suggest that inequality decreases in
Japan and Europe as ω increases from 0.425 to 0.69, in the previous section we have shown
analytically that the presence of offshoring introduces a new channel which can potentially lead
to an increase in inequality in both regions, as the share of neck-and-neck sectors increases.
This can counterbalance the negative effect shown in figure 6 and potentially yield stable or
even increasing inequality in the set of countries labelled the foreign region.
6.3 Offshoring
I now turn to the quantitative analysis of the economy with offshoring, featuring global labor
markets for both types of workers. I calibrate this version of the model using the same externally
calibrated parameters of the benchmark model without offshoring summarized in section 6.1,
and recalibrate the four ‘internal’ parameters (α,A, κ, ε) targeting the same statistics of the
benchmark model (growth rate, innovation/GDP, the skill premium, and residual inequality)
but using the relevant moments computed for the model with offshoring. The new calibrated
parameters are, α = 0.2, A = 1.12, κ = 0.1.49, and ε = 0.9, table 4 shows the fit of the model.
Table 4. Offshoring: model fit (1979)
Moments Data source Benchmark model
targeted
skill premium 0.4 Autor et al. (2008) 0.52
growth rate 0.011 CHS (2009) 0.01
R&D/GDP 0.09 CHS (2009) 0.12
variance log wages 0.05 Heatcote et al. (2010) 0.17
In table 5, I repeat the exercise of computing the share of the observed increase in inequality
that can be accounted for by an increase in ω from 0.425 to 0.69.
Table 5. International competition and inequality: offshoring
model data explained
Skill premium % change (1979-95) 0.015 0.218 0.0069
Residual inequality % change (1979-95) 0.061 0.3 0.203
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In this economy the observed increase in international competition can explain about seven
percent of the increase in the skill premium, and about 20 percent of the growth in residual
inequality. Thus this version of the model accounts for a smaller portion of the increase in
inequality then the economy with local labor markets. Compared to the latter, here factor-
price equalization implies that the increase in international competition does not trigger any
wage-stealing effect. The only channel through which changes in international competition
affect inequality in the leading region is by increasing the global efficiency of innovation, and
the results in table 5 show the quantitative relevance of this channel only. In the economy
without offshoring, instead, the efficiency effect does not operate but wage-stealing is active
and seems to be quantitatively powerful.
A unified framework accounting for all these channels is the ideal next step needed to obtain
a more complete assessment of the link between foreign technological competition and inequal-
ity. Available data show that the US economy is closer to the local labor market scenario than
to the perfect offshoring model, but the share of offshored production and innovation is far
from negligible. The BEA International Investment Statistics show that the employment share
of US affiliates of multinational corporations is on average 26 percent in the period I focus on,
and the R&D employment share of US affiliates is on average 12 percent. Using this data to
calibrate an hybrid version of the model featuring partial offshoring is an interesting task for
future research. Offshoring could be obtained as an equilibrium results driven by the balance
between the costs (offshoring costs) of producing abroad and the benefits (saving trade costs).
This would on one hand enrich the set up with an interesting feature of the real world but
would also complicate it severely. There are several models in the literature with equilibrium
offshoring, but they mostly feature exogenous technology. Recent attempts of modeling off-
shoring within an endogenous technical change framework are Nagavi and Ottaviano (2008),
Acemoglu, Gancia, and Zilibotti (2010), Gustaffson and Segerstrom (2011). In these papers
countries are symmetric, while the framework used here presents the additional difficulty of
studying asymmetric countries.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I have built a quality ladder model of endogenous technical change in which a
backward region progressively catches up with the leading region by increasing the number
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of industries in which its firms participate in innovation races for global leadership. Entry
of firms from the lagging country in global innovation races increase innovation and wage in-
equality in the leading region through two channels: the wage-stealing and the global efficiency
channel. The increase in international technological competition produced by foreign entry in
innovation leads to global market-share losses for the leading region, and to lower production
(unskilled) wages. This wage-stealing effect increases the skill premium directly by reducing
unskilled wages, and indirectly by reducing the cost of innovation, the skill-using activity in
the economy. Moreover, an increase in the skill premium induces workers with lower ability
to acquire education and, since skilled wages are proportional to workers’ ability, raises wage
dispersion. Offshoring production and innovation leads to equalization of factor prices across
regions, and neutralizes the wage-stealing effect. With global labor markets, fiercer interna-
tional competition produces higher inequality by increasing the efficiency of global innovation:
if innovation technology is characterized by decreasing returns at the regional level, as empirical
evidence suggests, foreign entry in innovation leads to a more efficient international allocation
of resources, thereby increasing the global demand for skills and the skill premium worldwide.
The quantitative analysis uses OECD data on R&D investment in manufacturing sectors to
build a model-specific measure of the degree of international technological competition between
the global leader, the US, and its followers, Japan and Europe. This measure is then used to
assess the relevance of the observed change in international competition for the dynamics of US
wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. I find that the increase in foreign competition observed
in the data accounts for up to 1/6th of the surge in the US skill premium and up to about one
half of the increase in residual inequality between 1979 and 1995.
As discussed in the introduction, there are several channels contributing to the evolution
of US wage inequality, each accounting for a portion of the observed increase. For instance,
Burstein and Vogel (2010) study the effects of trade on wages in a quantitative model of
trade and multinational production firms showing that the increase in trade and multinational
production observed between 1966 and 2006 account each for about 1/9th of the increase in
the US skill premium in that period. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) perform a similar
quantitative analysis with a model of trade and endogenous technical change showing that
trade liberalization accounts for about 1/5th of the increase in the US skill premium between
1970 and 1990. These numbers, together with the results of this paper, suggest that there are
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several plausible and quantitatively relevant channels linking globalization and wage inequality,
each explaining only a fraction of the overall increase shown in the data.
Further research could extend the model by removing the assumptions of costless trade and
offshoring, thus allowing for a joint analysis of trade liberalization, lower costs of offshoring,
and increasing technological competition. This would provide a unifying framework to asses
the role of these key features of globalization in shaping the distribution of wages. Removing
the assumption of costless trade by introducing variable trade costs is straightforward, while
introducing costly offshoring would be an interesting challenge. Endogenous offshoring deci-
sions would provide a more realistic benchmark economy by making the share of offshorable
activities an equilibrium result (as e.g. in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008, Gustaffson
and Segerstrom, 2010, and Burstein and Vogel, 2010). This economy would be a combination
of the two extreme economies studied in this paper, featuring both the wage-stealing and the
efficiency effect of fiercer international competition.
A Proofs
Proof for proposition 2. Let C =
(
cD + cF
)
/λ be global consumption, from (26) we know
that 2Γ(θ0) = C, thus θ0 = Γ
−1(C/2). Using this expression for θ0 into (6) we obtain wH =
σ/ [Γ−1(C/2)− γ]. Substituting this into (26) and (28) we obtain a system in three unknowns,
C, IDg , In.
C (λ− 1)
ρ+ 2In − n
A
2κ
(
In
A
) −α
1−α
=
σ
Γ−1(C/2)− γ (I)
C (λ− 1)
ρ+ IDg − n
A
2κ
(
IDg
A
) −α
1−α
=
σ
Γ−1(C/2)− γ , (II)
2 θ˜(C)
(
1− C
2
)
φ = 2κ
2ω
(
In
A
)1/(1−α)
+ (1− ω)
(
IDg
A
)1/(1−α) (III)
Totally differentiating equations (I)-(III) with respect to (w.r.t.) C, IDg , In and ω we obtainΦ1 Φ2 Φ3Φ4 Φ5 Φ6
Φ7 Φ8 Φ9
 dCdωdIDg
dω
dIn
dω
 =
 00
Φ10
 .
where Φ1, Φ2, Φ3 are the derivative of (I) w.r.t. C, I
D
g , and In respectively, Φ4, Φ5, Φ6 are the
derivative of (II) w.r.t. C, IDg , and In respectively, Φ7, Φ8, Φ9, Φ10 are the derivative of (III)
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w.r.t. C, IDg , In, and ω respectively. It is easy to show that the following results hold: Φ1 > 0,
Φ2 = 0, Φ3 < 0, Φ4 > 0, Φ5 < 0, Φ6 = 0, Φ8 < 0, Φ9 < 0, and Φ10 > 0. As I show below the
sign of, Φ7 is not relevant for the purpose of this proof. While Φ10 > 0 if 2
1−αIn > IDg , which
can be proved as follows: combining (I) and (II) we obtain
(
IDg
) α
1−α (ρ+ IDg − n) = (In) α1−α (ρ+ 2IDn − n) ,
which if 21−αIn = IDg yields 1 = 2
1−α which holds only for a linear R&D technology, that is
α = 0. For any 0 < α < 1, (I) and (II) are satisfied only if 21−αIn > IDg , which allows us to
proof that Φ10 is positive. Once we signed all the Φs it is easy to show that det(Φ) > 0, and
using Cramer’s rule we obtain
dC
dω
= −Φ3Φ5Φ10
det(Φ)
< 0,
dIDg
dω
=
Φ3Φ4Φ10
det(Φ)
< 0,
dIDg
dω
=
Φ1Φ5Φ10
det(Φ)
< 0
Since 2Γ(θ0) = C and wH = σ/ (θ0 − γ), we can conclude that increases in ω raises the share
of skilled workers in the economy, increases the skill premium and residual inequality.
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